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EMPLOYMENT: SEXUAL HARASSMENT
INTRODUCTION
Sexual harassment in the workplace has been an enigma both in the
nature of the acts which violate Title VII and the extent of an employer's
liability for the acts of harassing employees. In recent decades Supreme
Court rulings have broadly advanced the goals of congressional legisla-
tion' to define both actionable sexual harassment in the workplace and
the related responsibilities of the employer.2 However, Congress and the
Court have left much of the specifics for the federal circuits to determine,
as discussed in the following analysis.'
Part I of this survey' analyzes the elements which make up a claim
for sexual harassment in the Tenth Circuit, focusing primarily on Sey-
more v. Shawver & Sons, Inc.' Seymore adopted a four-part standard nec-
essary for asserting a claim of hostile environment sexual harassment,
but failed to further clarify the specific nature of conduct violating Title
VII. Part II examines the employer's liability for the hostile environment
sexual harassment committed by both employees and supervisors, fo-
cusing on Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc.6 In Harrison, the Tenth Circuit
appeared to establish strict liability for employers whose supervisors
commit hostile environment sexual harassment.
1. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1995). Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 states that
it is unlawful for an employer "to discriminate against any individual with respect to his [or her]
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin." Id.
2. See Harris v. Forklift Sys. Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 17 (1993) (adopting an objective/subjective
standard for determining the existence of hostile environment sexual harassment while clarifying
what types of behavior contribute to a hostile environment); Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S.
57, 72 (1986) (holding that hostile environment sexual harassment is a violation of Title VII and that
courts should look to agency principles for guidance in determining employer liability for sexual
harassment by employees).
3. Jennifer L. Johnson, Note, Employment Law, 38 S. TEx. L. REV. 965, 974-75 (1997). The
only guidance the Meritor Court gave regarding liability was to advise the district and circuit courts
to look to agency principles to determine employer liability for the hostile environment sexual har-
assment by supervisors and stated that employers are not strictly liable for their supervisors' tortious
conduct. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72-73. However, due to the "malleable" nature of agency principles,
the circuits have reached conflicting conclusions regarding employer liability. Johnson, supra, at
975.
4. The survey period covered cases decided between September 1, 1996 and August 31,
1997.
5. I11 F.3d 794(10th Cir. 1997).
6. 112 F.3d 1437 (10th Cir. 1997); see infra note 232 (discussing the subsequent history of
Harrison).
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I. REQUIREMENTS FOR A SEXUAL HARASSMENT CLAIM IN THE TENTH
CIRCUIT
A. Background
There are two theories of liability on which to bring a cause of ac-
tion for workplace sexual harassment: quid pro quo and hostile work
environment.! Quid pro quo sexual harassment occurs when an employee
either performs sexual favors for a supervisor in return for employment
privileges or suffers adverse, work-related repercussions for refusing a
supervisor's advances In the early 1970s, when sexual harassment
claims were new to the courts, no analogous law addressed the issue.9 As
the case law sought to root sexual harassment in the expanded theories of
racial and ethnic harassment, the subsequent years saw the development
of the first cause of action recognized by the courts as the unlawful barter
defined in this theory of liability.'
Generally, the elements required for stating a claim of quid pro quo
sexual harassment are that: (1) the victim/employee was a member of a
protected group; (2) the victim was subject to sexual harassment; (3) the
harassment was due to the victim's sex; (4) the victim's response to the
alleged harassment affected tangible aspects of the victim's employment
and the submission or refusal to cooperate with the harasser's demands
were an express or implied condition as to whether the victim's employ-
ment is positively or negatively impacted; and (5) the harassment was
carried on by the employee or supervisor in the course of his employ-
ment, incurring employer liability." In finding quid pro quo sexual har-
assment, most courts focus on the connection between the alleged har-
7. See J. Hoult Verkerke, Notice Liability in Employment Discrimination Law, 81 VA. L.
REV. 273, 280 n.15 (1995) (discussing the development and treatment of employer liability for quid
pro quo sexual harrassment among the various circuits).
8. Id.
9. See David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Exacerbating the Exasperating: Title VII Liability of
Employers for Sexual Harassment Committed by Their Supervisors, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 66, 109-10
(1995) ('[C]onditioning employment on sexual demands, and harassment through sexual advances,
had no ready analogue in existing employment and discrimination law.").
10. Id.
11. Lynn T. Dickinson, Note, Quid Pro Quo Sexual Harassment: A New Standard, 2 WM. &
MARY J. WoMEN & L. 107, 108-09 (1995). The article states:
To determine whether a plaintiff has proven quid pro quo sexual harassment, most
courts use the following five-part test:
(1) The employee belongs to a protected group.
(2) The employee was subject to unwelcome sexual harassment.
(3) The harassment complained of was based upon sex.
(4) The employee's reaction to [the] harassment complained of affected tangible as-
pects of the employee's compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment. The acceptance or rejection of the harassment by an employee must be an ex-
press or implied condition to the receipt of a job benefit or the cause of a tangible job
detriment in order to create liability under this theory of sexual harassment ....
(5) Respondeat superior.
Id. (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 909 (11 th Cir.1982)).
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assment and the promised employment benefit or detriment.'2 However,
to date, this set of elements has not been adopted by the Tenth Circuit."
The court instead focuses on whether "'specific benefits of employment
[were] conditioned on sexual demands' by the victim's supervisor.""
The second basis of liability is hostile environment sexual harass-
ment," which results when an employee suffers sexually discriminatory
practices by co-employees or supervisors creating a hostile or abusive
work environment.'6 An actionable claim under this theory, defined by
the Supreme Court in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,'7 requires hostile
environment sexual harassment to be "sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to
alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment and create an abusive
working environment.""' The Meritor Court found guidance from the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which treated this
form of harassment as violating Title VII.'9 The EEOC adopted this posi-
tion in its Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex'" despite contro-
versy, including initial criticism by Reagan transition team member,
Clarence Thomas.2' However, the Court in Meritor ultimately concluded
that a cause of action existed by acknowledging the EEOC's conclusion
that hostile environment sexual harassment is unlawful.
In Meritor, a Meritor Savings Bank employee brought a claim for
sexual harassment in violation of Title VII against the bank and her su-
pervisor.' The alleged harassment included rape and fondling of the em-
ployee by the supervisor in front of other employees.' The bank argued
that regardless of whether an actual sexual relationship existed, the lan-
guage, congressional intent, and judicial interpretation of Title VII only
12. Marlisa Vinciguerra, Note, The Aftermath of Meritor: A Search for Standards in the Law
of Sexual Harassment, 98 YALE L.J. 1717, 1722 (1989) ("Courts focus upon the nexus between the
alleged threats and economic detriment: The judicial gloss on the quid pro quo claim requires a clear
temporal link between the advances or threats and adverse employment decisions.").
13. Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 112 F.3d 1437, 1443 (10th Cir. 1997).
14. Id. at 1443 (quoting Ball v. Renner, 54 F.3d 664, 665 n.2 (10th Cir. 1995)).
15. Id.; Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986).
16. Harrison, 112 F.3d at 1443.
17. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
18. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 798 (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir.
1982)).
19. Id.
20. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1985).
21. Oppenheimer, supra note 9, at 115-16. Oppenheimer states:
The EEOC's view that "hostile work environment" sexual harassment violates Title VII
was highly controversial at the time it was proposed. [The view] ... was criticized in a
report to President-elect Reagan from transition team member Clarence Thomas, who
predicted that it would lead "to a barrage of trivial complaints against employers around
the nation."
Id.
22. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65-67 ("Since the guidelines were issued, courts have uniformly held,
and we agree, that a plaintiff may establish a violation of Title VII by proving that discrimination
based on sex has created a hostile or abusive work environment.").
23. Id. at 60.
24. Id.
1998]
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focused on economic detriment resulting from the harassment or sexual
favors given quid pro quo for economic benefits.' The Court held that
the language of Title VII was intended "'to strike at the entire spectrum
of disparate treatment of men and women' in employment,"' and agreed
with the EEOC's Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex which
describe sexual harassment as including "verbal or physical conduct of a
sexual nature."' The Court found this treatment to be prohibited by Title
VII where "such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably inter-
fering with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating,
hostile, or offensive working environment." Rather than following the
EEOC's lead, however, the Court held that an actionable claim of hostile
environment sexual harassment required the harassment not only to af-
fect working conditions, but also to be sufficiently oppressive to create
an abusive working environment.'
After Meritor, the federal circuits struggled with defining the con-
duct and injury that constituted actionable hostile environment sexual
harassment until the Supreme Court sought to resolve these conflicts in
Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc." Harris clarified the Court's Meritor
decision by holding that a hostile environment exists "[w]hen the work-
place is permeated with 'discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and in-
sult,' that is 'sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the
victim's employment and create an abusive working environment."'"
3
This environment was to be evaluated in light of a standard, incorporat-
ing both an objective and subjective prong, adopted by the Court to de-
termine the presence of a hostile working environment. 2 This standard
requires that the victim subjectively perceive the environment to be hos-
tile while at the same time an objective person would also view the con-
ditions as such." This standard helped address the question of whether
and what type of injury was required for Title VII to apply.'
25. Id. at 64 ("[Petitioner] contends . . . that in prohibiting discrimination with respect to
'compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges' of employment, Congress was concerned with what
petitioner describes as 'tangible loss of an economic character, [and] purely psychological aspects of
the workplace environment."' (quoting Brief for Petitioner 30-31, 34)).
26. Id. at 64 (quoting Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707
n.13 (quoting Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971))).
27. Merifor, 477 U.S. at 65 (quoting 29 C.F.R § 1604.1 t(a) (1985)).
28. Id. (quoting C.F.R. § 1604.1 l(a)(3)).
29. Id. at 67.
30. 510 U.S. 17, 20 (1993) ("We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the Circuits on
whether conduct, to be actionable as 'abusive work environment' harassment ... must 'seriously
affect [an employee's] psychological well-being' or lead the plaintiff to 'suffe[r] injury."' (altera-
tions in original) (citation omitted)).
31. Harris, 510 U.S. at 21 (citation omitted) (quoting Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65, 67).
32. Id. at 21-22.
33. Id. The court stated:
Conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive
work environment . . . is beyond Title VII's purview. Likewise, if the victim does not
[Vol. 75:3
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Applying the objective/subjective standard, the Court stated that the
determining factor of whether a Title VII violation occurred was not
proof of actual injury, psychological or otherwise, but whether "the envi-
ronment would reasonably be perceived, and is perceived, as hostile or
abusive."' 5 Furthermore, the Court held that a determination of whether
an environment was hostile should be made only after examining all of
the circumstances." Such circumstances include "the frequency of the
discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening
or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasona-
bly interferes with an employee's work performance."' The Court noted
that the harassment's psychological effect on the employee was relevant
to finding an environment abusive but, "while psychological harm, like
any other relevant factor, may be taken into account, no single factor is
required." 38
Even with the Harris clarification, the circuits still differ in their
opinions on the specific type and quantum of behavior that violates Title
VII. For example, the Seventh Circuit appears to require substantially
higher standards for demonstrating a hostile work environment.39 In
Baskerville v. Culligan International Co., a supervisor of the defendant
employer subjected the plaintiff employee to vulgar and suggestive con-
duct over a period of seven months. ' This conduct included gestures
suggesting masturbation and references to the employee as "pretty girl"
and "Ms. Anita Hill."' The plaintiff brought an action for sexual harass-
ment in violation of Title VII against her employer. ' At trial, the jury
awarded the plaintiff $25,000 in damages. ' After Culligan International
appealed, the Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, concluding that no
reasonable jury could have found that the supervisor's remarks created a
hostile working environment." The majority stated that an actionable
hostile work environment for purposes of proving sexual harassment is
one considered "hellish" for the harassed women. ' In its analysis, the
subjectively perceive the environment to be abusive, the conduct has not actually altered
the conditions of the victim's employment and there is no Title VII violation.
Id.
34. Id. at 22 (stating that Title VII did not mandate a threshold question of whether the con-
duct affected the plaintiffs psychological well-being or suffered injury, but only required that "the
environment would reasonably be perceived, and is perceived, as hostile or abusive").
35. Id.
36. Id. at 23.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See Baskerville v. Culligan Int'l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 430-31 (7th Cir. 1995).
40. Baskerville, 50 F.3d at 430.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 428.
43. Id. at 430.
44. Id. at 431.
45. Id. ("The concept of sexual harassment is designed to protect working women from the
kind of male attentions that can make the workplace hellish for women .... It is not designed to
purge the workplace of vulgarity."); see Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 123 F.3d 490, 502 (7th
1998]
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court declared that there was a "'line that separates the merely vulgar and
mildly offensive from the deeply offensive and sexually harassing,"'
which was not a bright line but varied with the circumstances.' Further-
more, the court held that "[a] handful of comments spread over months is
unlikely to have so great an emotional impact as a concentrated or inces-
sant barrage."'
The Tenth Circuit adopted the Meritor holding in Hicks v. Gates
Rubber Company.' In Hicks, a security guard alleged that she was sub-
jected to sexual jokes, sexually offensive language, and unwanted
touching by her supervisor and other co-employees over an eight-month
period. '9 She also alleged that she was subjected to general disparate
treatment based on her sex.' At trial, the court dismissed the plaintiffs
sexual harassment claims because it found no evidence that the supervi-
sor made his advances or sexual treatment a condition of employment, or
quid pro quo harassment." The Tenth Circuit, deferring to the recent
Meritor decision, reversed and remanded because the trial court failed to
consider whether the conduct constituted hostile environment sexual
harassment. 2 Hicks further held that a finding of hostile environment
sexual harassment requires an evaluation of the totality of the circum-
stances, rather than listing specific elements to be considered."
In Hirase-Doi v. U.S. West Communications, Inc.,' the Tenth Cir-
cuit adopted the subjective/objective standard from the Supreme Court's
recent holding in Harris as the appropriate standard of review for
whether a work environment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to vio-
late Title VII.L In Hirase-Doi, an operator for U.S. West Communica-
tions, Inc. (U.S. West) brought a sexual harassment claim alleging sexual
Cir. 1997) (stating that theoretically, a cause of action for hostile environment harassment will not
exist until the harassment reaches a "severe and pervasive" level).
46. Baskerville, 50 F.3d at 431 (quoting Car v. Allison Gas Turbine Div., 32 F.3d 1007, 1010
(7th Cir. 1994)).
47. Id.
48. 833 F.2d 1406 (10th Cir. 1987).
49. Hicks, 833 F.2d at 1408-10. The allegations included an incident where the plaintiff's
supervisor rubbed her thigh and told her, "I think you're going to make it" an admonition that the
supervisor was going to "put his foot up [her] ass so far that [she] would have to go to the clinic to
take it out;" and her supervisor's touching of her buttocks while stating, "I'm going to get you yet."
Id. at 1409-10.
50. Id. at 1408-10.
51. Id. at 1411, 1414.
52. Id. at 1414-16.
53. Id.; see Hirschfeld v. New Mexico Corrections Dep't, 916 F.2d 572, 575-76 (10th Cir.
1990).
54. 61 F.3d 777(10th Cir. 1995).
55. Hirase-Doi, 61 F.3d at 782 ("In Harris v. ForklifI Systems, Inc., the Supreme Court re-
quired both an objectively hostile work environment, as well as a subjective perception by the plain-




harassment by a co-employee, Kenneth Coleman.' The harassment con-
sisted of Coleman's sexually offensive behavior towards other employ-
ees and an incident where he grabbed the plaintiff between the thighs."
The grabbing incident led to Coleman's suspension and immediate resig-
nation. 8 The trial court held that by suspending Coleman immediately
after grabbing the plaintiff, U.S. West took appropriate remedial action
and granted summary judgment for U.S. West 9 The Tenth Circuit, how-
ever, reversed and remanded, holding that even if U.S. West was un-
aware of Coleman's harassment of the plaintiff, it could have been put on
notice of the harassment by his previous conduct toward other employ-
ees.' Furthermore, the court held that Coleman's harassment of other
employees contributed to a hostile work environment as long as the
plaintiff was aware of it during the time she was harassed.6
B. Tenth Circuit Decisions
1. Seymore v. Shawver & Sons, Inc.'
a. Facts
Lou Ella Seymore, a female journeyman electrician employee of
Shawver & Sons, Inc. (Shawver), was subjected to sexually offensive
remarks and gestures during her employment.' She repeatedly com-
plained about the conduct to her job steward and filed a grievance with
her union." However, according to Seymore, the sexually inappropriate
conduct never ceased.' She filed a discrimination charge against
Shawver with the Oklahoma Human Rights Commission (OHRC), who
then filed a charge with the EEOC on her behalf.' Shawver subsequently
terminated her employment.' Seymore then filed another charge with the
EEOC alleging both racial and sexual discrimination." In addition, she
filed suits against Shawver and the union alleging sexual discrimination
and retaliatory practices. ' At trial, the district court granted summary
56. Id. at 780.
57. Id. at 780-81. Coleman's harassing conduct towards employees other than the plaintiff




60. Id. at 783-86.
61. Id. at 782-83.
62. 111 F.3d794(1OthCir. 1997).
63. Seymore, Ill F.3d at 796 ("Ms. Seymore claims she was subjected to a plethora of sexu-
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judgment for the union. ' The court also granted summary judgment for
Shawver on the retaliatory practices claim for lack of subject matter ju-
risdiction because Seymore did not allege retaliation in her EEOC charge
against Shawver.7' The jury returned a verdict for Shawver on the sexual
discrimination claim.72 Seymore appealed the district court's summary
judgment on her discrimination claim against the union, claiming error in
not holding the union responsible for unlawful sexual harassment by
Shawver and in granting summary judgment Shawver's favor."
b. Decision
In defining a sexually hostile work environment under the Meritor
rule, the Tenth Circuit adopted the Eighth Circuit's holding in Marquart
v. Lodge 837, International Association of Machinists & Aerospace
Workers," which established the four elements that comprise a prima
facie case of hostile environment sexual harassment." Under this stan-
dard a plaintiff must show that: "1) she is a member of a protected group;
2) she was subject to unwelcome harassment; 3) the harassment was
based on sex; and 4) the harassment altered a term, condition, or privi-
lege of the plaintiff's employment, creating an abusive working envi-
ronment."'6 The court applied the Meritor severe or pervasive standard of
review to the adopted elements of hostile environment sexual harassment
and found that the union workers.' sexual harassment of Seymore was not
severe enough to violate Title VII."
The court further held that because the jury found for defendant
Shawver on the sexual harassment claim, Seymore's sexual harassment
claim against the union likewise failed because under Title VII the union
could not be held liable for the employer's actions as a matter of law: 8
[A] union may be held responsible under Title VII for discriminatory
practices by an employer if the union does not take appropriate action
against such practices .... However, where a jury determines an em-
ployer did not engage in unlawful discrimination under Title VII, a






74. 26 F.3d 842 (8th Cir. 1994).
75. Seymore, III F.3d at 797 (citing Marquart, 26 F.3d at 853).
76. ld. (quoting Marquart, 26 F.3d at 853).





2. Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc.'
a. Facts
Jeanne Harrison, a female underground potash miner, suffered un-
wanted sexual conduct from her male supervisor over a period of two
months." The supervisor's conduct including groping, requests to have
sex, and forcing Harrison to masturbate him.82 Subsequently, she reported
the conduct to a manager in the mine's safety office." In response, the
human resources manager placed her on administrative leave pending an
investigation into her grievance.' After hearing the conflicting accounts
of the events, including the supervisor's claims that the conduct was con-
sensual, the human resources manager decided Harrison would be reim-
bursed for lost time, and provided with medical and counseling support if
needed."5 Moreover, her supervisor was placed on permanent probation
and ordered not to work with Harrison." Harrison never returned to work
and was terminated the following year due to reductions in the mine's
work force."
Harrison then brought actions under Title VII for hostile work envi-
ronment sexual harassment against her supervisor and employer." At
trial, the jury returned verdicts for the defendants on the sexual harass-
ment claim and Harrison appealed, alleging that the jury was improperly
instructed regarding employer liability.9 She also alleged that the trial
court improperly required that before establishing employer liability the
plaintiff must prove the harasser was a supervisor who had authority over
the conditions of employment, including the authority to hire and fire.'
b. Decision
Before analyzing the sexual harassment liability implications for the
employer regarding sexual harassment, the Tenth Circuit referred to
Meritor's quotation of the EEOC's Guidelines on Discrimination Be-
cause of Sex9' that hostile environment sexual harassment occurs where a
supervisor's or co-worker's sexual conduct "has the purpose or effect of
80. 112 F.3d 1437 (10th Cir. 1997).
81. Harrison, 112 F.3d at 1440-41.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1441.
85. Id. at 1441-42.
86. Id. at 1442.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1439.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1447 (adopted from Sauers v. Salt Lake County, 1 F.3d 1122, 1125 (10th Cir.
1993)).
91. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1985).
1998]
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unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or cre-
ating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment."
C. Other Circuits
In Perry v. Ethan Allen, Inc.,9 the Second Circuit held that hostile
environment sexual harassment required a showing of two elements.
The first is that the sexual harassment is "sufficiently severe or pervasive
to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive
working environment." '5 The second is that there was a basis on which
conduct creating the abusive environment could be imputed to the em-
ployer. '
To satisfy the severe or pervasive standard of the first element, the
alleged incidents had to be "more than episodic," and should be "suffi-
ciently continuous and concerted in order to be deemed pervasive."9' The
court also noted that an important factor in finding a hostile environment
was the environment itself: "Evidence of a general work atmosphere...
as well as evidence of specific hostility directed toward the plaintiff'
should be evaluated." However, in Torres v. Pisano,' the Second Circuit
also noted that "even a single episode of harassment, if severe enough,
can establish a hostile work environment."''
In contrast, the Seventh Circuit held in.Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of
America' that hostile environment sexual harassment occurs "[w]hen the
workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule and
insult, that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the
victim's employment and create an abusive working environment. ' ' "n The
court clarified the required threshold of unlawful conduct for actionable
92. Harrison, 112 F.3d at 1443 (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986)
(quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (a))).
93. 115 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 1997).
94. Perry, 115 F.3d at 149.
95. Id. (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17,21 (1993)).
96. Id. at 143. In Perry, the plaintiff claimed she was sexually harassed by her coworkers. Id.
at 146. Specifically, she alleged she was subjected to catcalls, that certain of her coworkers "asked
her to have sex, pulled at her bra strap, pulled at her pants, pawed her neck, rubbed up against her
and grab[bedJ at [her] chest." Id. at 147 (alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted). The
defendant employer presented evidence that it had in place a sexual harassment policy and that on
the day it was notified of the harassment by the plaintiff, it began an investigation which, in the
absence of any corroborating evidence for the plaintiff's allegations, resulted only in reprimands of
the coworkers. Id. at 148. The jury found that a hostile environment existed but that because the
employer took appropriate remedial action after notice of the harassment, it rendered a verdict for
the defendant and the Second Circuit affirmed. Id. at 143.
97. Id. (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 2 1).
98. Id. (quoting Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.3d 1406, 1415 (1993)).
99. 116 F.3d 625 (2d Cir. 1997).
100. Torres, 116 F.3d at 631 n.4.
101. 123 F.3d 490 (7th Cir. 1997).
102. Jansen, 123 F.3d at 533 (citations omitted).
[Vol. 75:3
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sexual harassment as consisting of neither "'isolated and/or trivial re-
marks of a sexual nature" '' 't nor harassment that is "'too tepid or inter-
mittent or equivocal to make a reasonable person believe that she has
been discriminated against on the basis of sex."'"' Furthermore, the Sev-
enth Circuit reiterated its language from Baskerville stating that the pur-
pose of hostile environment sexual harassment is "to protect working
women from the kind of male attentions that can make the workplace
hellish for women.''
D. Analysis
While Seymore established the four factors necessary for a prima
facie case of hostile environment sexual harassment, neither it nor
Harrison had any occasion to give further indication of what specific
types of conduct would contribute to hostile environment sexual harass-
ment. Both decisions merely reiterated the vague definition of an action-
able claim of hostile environment sexual harassment from Meritor. How-
ever, after both the Seymore and Harrison decisions during this survey
period, a panel of Tenth Circuit court justices issued an order denying a
petition for rehearing en banc in Rocha Vigil v. City of Las Cruses."0 ' In a
dissent, Judge Lucero critidized the panel, and the court as a whole, for
relying on its Hicks holding that for hostile environment sexual harass-
ment to apply, "[t]here must be a steady barrage of opprobrious racial [or
sexual] comment" such that the work environment is "so heavily polluted
with discrimination as to destroy the emotional and psychological stabil-
ity of the minority [employee]. ''""I Judge Lucero argued that in light of
the Supreme Court's holding in Harris, psychological injury alone can-
not be a determinative factor indicating a Title VII violation and Hicks
should be overruled.'1
Furthermore, according to Judge Lucero, the Tenth Circuit cases
subsequent to Harris have continued to require Hicks's "steady barrage"
103. Id. (quoting Galloway v. General Motors, 78 F.3d 1164, 1168 (7th Cir. 1996)).
104. Id. (quoting Rennie v. Dalton, 3 F.3d 1100, 1107 (7th Cir. 1993)).
105. Id. (citing Baskerville v. Culligan Int'l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 430 (7th Cir. 1995)). In Jansen,
the plaintiff argued that her boss sexually harassed her by subjecting her to unwanted and offensive
sexual advances that included intimations that her raise would not be held up if she allowed his
advances. Id. at 493. This was the basis for an unsuccessful quid pro quo argument. Id. Her hostile
environment claim was based on other remarks of a similar nature made by her boss. Id. The plain-
tiff claims she was subjected to sexual advances by one of her supervisors in her marketing division
of Burlington Industries which consisted of intimations that sexual relations with that supervisor
would lead to success and promotions. Id. In both cases, the court remanded for resolution of mate-
rial issues of fact. Id. at 490, 495.
106. 119 F.3d 871 (10th Cir. 1997).
107. Rocha Vigil, 119 F.3d at 872 (quoting Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1412-13
(10th Cir. 1987)).
108. Id. ("[O]ur claim in Hicks that 'Title VII is violated only where the work environment is
so heavily polluted with discrimination as to destroy the emotional and psychological stability of the
minority employee' cannot stand.").
19981
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of harassing conduct to find a Title VII violation.'" Such a requirement is
not well-suited to this purpose in light of its historical association with a
required psychological injury."' He therefore argued that that test should
be abandoned because it requires a much more severe standard than re-
quired under Harris."'
The Tenth Circuit's adoption of the elements for a prima facie case
for hostile environment sexual harassment will provide a necessary and
uniform guide for employers, attorneys, and the courts in the future.
However, the absence of clear parameters or consensus as to the nature
and quantum of conduct necessary for an actionable hostile environment
sexual harassment claim leaves employers without direction as to how to
structure internal sexual harassment policies and evaluate such griev-
ances from employees.
II. EMPLOYER LIABILITY FOR SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF EMPLOYEES BY
SUPERVISORS
A. Background
Quid pro quo sexual harassment and hostile environment sexual
harassment have had different liability implications for employers in the
Tenth Circuit."2 If a district court finds quid pro quo sexual harassment
by a supervisor, the employer is generally held strictly liable for the ac-
tions of the supervisor."' However, the Supreme Court specifically held
that employers should not be strictly liable for the hostile environment
sexual harassment caused by their supervisors"" and the Tenth Circuit has
109. Id. at 872.
110. Id.at872-73.
111. Id. at 873. Judge Lucero stated:
In its continued reliance on Hicks, this court appears to believe that only the most egre-
gious cases will give rise to an actionable claim of hostile work environment under Title
VII. Such a belief is entirely without foundation. As the Second Circuit has noted even
since I requested an en banc hearing, Harris stands for a very simple and straightforward
proposition: "Whenever the harassment is of such quality or quantity that a reasonable
employee would find the conditions of her employment altered for the worse, it is action-
able under Title VII, so long as the employee subjectively experienced the hostile work
environment."
Id. (quoting Torres v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 625, 633 (2nd Cir. 1997)).
112. Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 112 F.3d 1437, 1443 (10th Cir. 1997). The court stated that
"[i]n cases involving quid pro quo harassment, courts routinely hold, with little or no discussion, that
the employer is 'strictly liable."' Id. However, the Tenth Circuit stopped short of this standard for
hostile environment sexual harassment: "As the Supreme Court specifically emphasized in Meritor,
and as this court has since acknowledged, an employer is not strictly liable for hostile work envi-
ronment sexual harassment committed by one of its supervisors." Id. at 1451.
113. Id. But see Sims v. Brown & Root Indus. Serv., Inc., 889 F. Supp. 920, 923 (W.D. La.
1995), affd, 78 F.3d 581 (5th Cir: 1996) (holding that defendant would be liable for quid pro quo
sexual harassment if the employer had notice of the harassment and failed to take prompt remedial
action).
114. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986).
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acknowledged this limitation."' The Meritor Court advised the lower
courts to refer to agency principles in order to avoid findings of strict
liability. "6
In the years following the Meritor decision, the circuits split over
the correct test for employer liability for hostile environment sexual har-
assment by a supervisor."' Several circuits followed the negligence stan-
dard without holding the employer strictly liable."8 For example, the
Sixth Circuit, in Kauffman v. Allied Signal,"9 held that in order to find the
employer liable, the plaintiff must show that the supervisor's actions
were foreseeable or within his scope of employment.1 However, even if
the plaintiff carried its burden, the defendant could still succeed by
showing that the employer responded appropriately to avoid liability.'2'
In Kauffian, a supervisor and other co-employees harassed the plaintiff
after she had breast enlargement surgery."' Once the harassment by the
supervisor was reported to the company, the supervisor was terminated."'
The trial court found the harassment neither foreseeable nor within the
scope of the supervisor's employment.'" Ultimately, the trial court held
that the supervisor's immediate termination upon first notification of the
harassment was an appropriate remedial response and absolved the em-
ployer of liability; the Sixth Circuit agreed."'
The Third Circuit also followed this negligence standard in Andrews
v. City of Philadelphia." The Andrews court required the trial judge, in
light of all the circumstances, to determine whether plaintiff's working
environment was one which women of "reasonable sensibilities" would
find hostile or offensive.' Under such conditions an employer could be
115. See Harrison, 112 F.3d at 1451.
116. Id. (stating that since Congress's definition of "employer" includes agents of the employer,
this demonstrates an intent to limit the acts of employees for which employers are liable under Title
VII). The court stated in Meritor:
Congress' decision to define "employer" to include any "agent" of an employer . . .
surely evinces an intent to place some limits on the acts of employees for which employ-
ers under Title VII are to be held responsible. For this reason, we hold that the Court of
Appeals erred in concluding that employers are always automatically liable for sexual
harassment by their supervisors.
Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72.
117. See Oppenheimer, supra note 9, at 131.
118. Id.at132-33.
119. 970 F.2d 178 (6th Cir. 1992).
120. Kauffman, 970 F.2d at 184 ("[Tjhe determination of whether or not Allied is liable for its
supervisor's actions depends on 1) whether [the supervisor's] harassing actions were foreseeable or
fell within his scope of employment and 2) even if they were, whether Allied responded adequately
and effectively to negate liability.").
121. Id.
122. Id. at 179-81.
123. Id. at 181.
124. Id. at 184.
125. Id. at 185.
126. 895 F.2d 1469 (3d Cir. 1990).
127. Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1486.
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liable by respondeat superior if, under Meritor's direction to look to
agency principles, the employer knew or should have known of the har-
assment and failed to take adequate remedial action. '28 The First, Eighth,
and Ninth Circuits have subsequently followed this direct negligence
standard in a similar fashion.'"
Some circuits have kept the negligence standard while also adopting
elements of agency law. 3' The Eleventh Circuit, in Faragher v. City of
Boca Raton,3 ' held the employer could be liable if it had actual or con-
structive knowledge of the sexual harassment and failed to take prompt
remedial action.' 2 In addition, the court held that liability would attach if
the harassing supervisor acted as the employer's agent while creating the
hostile environment.'33 However, the court noted it would be rare for a
supervisor to act as an agent while creating a hostile environment, since
such tortious behavior is not within the scope of any supervisor's em-
ployment.'
The Second Circuit in Karibian v. Columbia University,'5 came
close to holding employers automatically liable for their supervisors'
sexual harassment of employees.' In that case, the plaintiff alleged that
she was pressured into a sexual relationship with her supervisor. "'i The
trial court granted summary judgment for the defendant employer on the
128. Id. ("Thus, if a plaintiff proves that management-level employees had actual or construc-
tive knowledge about the existence of a sexually hostile environment and failed to take prompt and
adequate remedial action, the employer will be liable.").
129. See Klessens v. United States Postal Serv., 42 F.3d 1384 (1st Cir. 1994) (adopting direct
liability standard and holding that the victim's verbal complaints of harassment by her supervisor to
management were insufficient to put the company on notice and also that the employer's subsequent
transfer of the supervisor was appropriate, thereby avoiding liability); Steiner v. Showboat Operating
Co., 25 F.3d 1459 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that even where the vice-president of the company is the
alleged harasser, employer liability would result only if the company failed to adequately respond to
the victim's complaint, ignoring any claim of vicarious liability); Davis v. Tri-State Mack Distribs.,
Inc., 981 F.2d 340 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding that since the victim gave notice of sexual harassment to
the branch manager, she did not have to also complain to corporate headquarters to impute liability
to the employer); Oppenheimer, supra note 9, at 134.
130. See id. at 136.
131. 76 F.3d 1155, vacated on reh'g en banc, 83 F.3d 1346 (11 th Cir. 1996).
132. Faragher, 76 F.3d at 1164 ("The district court correctly reconciled this precedent in hold-
ing that an employer may be liable in a hostile environment case if either (1) the employer knew or
should have known of the harassment and failed to take prompt remedial action, or (2) the harasser
acted as the employer's agent.").
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1164-65.
135. 14 F.3d 773 (2d Cir. 1994). In holding that employers could be liable solely if the harasser
was aided in the harassment by the existence of the agency relationship under Restatement (Second)
of Agency section 219(2)(d), the Harrison court found support in the Second Circuit's holding in
Karibian. Harrison, 112 F.3d at 1445-46.
136. David L. Gregory, Sex Discrimination: Continuing Clarifications by the Second Circuit,
61 BROOK. L. REV. 363, 393-94 (1995) (explaining how the court's merging of liability standards
for quid pro quo sexual harassment indicate the court's pro-plaintiff slant).
137. Karibian, 14 F.3d at 776.
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plaintiff's hostile environment sexual harassment claim on the grounds
that the employer had no notice of the harassment and also had a griev-
ance procedure in place.'38 the Second Circuit reversed, holding that if
the factfinder found for plaintiff on her allegations of hostile environ-
ment sexual harassment, the employer would be liable regardless of ac-
tual or constructive notice because the supervisor misused the em-
ployer's delegated authority to create an abusive working environment.'39
However, the Karibian court also stated that if the supervisor did not rely
on his authority, then employer liability could only be established using
the negligence standard."
In contrast to the Second Circuit's holding in Karibian, the D.C.
Circuit in Gary v. Long'' stated that the supervisor's agency relation to
the employer always aids accomplishment of the unlawful activity be-
cause the supervisor's authority includes responsibilities requiring the
supervisor to be proximate to and regularly meet with his or her employ-
ees. 2 The court agreed with the district court that the employee had suf-
fered hostile environment sexual harassment but refused to hold the em-
ployer liable for the supervisor's abuse of authority to facilitate the har-
assment."3 The court held that no liability imputes if an employer creates
a hostile work environment grievance policy and informs the plaintiff
employee to the extent that the employee knew or should have known
that the unlawful conduct of her supervisor was not authorized or con-
doned by the employer.'"
In Hicks, the Tenth Circuit adopted sections 219(1) and 219(2) of
the Restatement (Second) of Agency as possible bases for employer li-
ability in hostile environment sexual harassment in employment. ' These
138. Id. at 775.
139. Id. at 780. While not specifically addressing the separate clauses of section 219(2)(d), the
court nevertheless held that the employer, Columbia, would be liable "regardless of the absence of
notice or the reasonableness of Columbia's complaint procedures." Id.
140. Id.; see also Kracunas v. Iona College, 119 F.3d 80, 88-89 (2d Cir. 1997) (applying the
negligence standard when supervisor did not rely on supervisory authority).
141. 59 F.3d 1391 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
142. Gary, 59 F.3d at 1397 ("In a sense, a supervisor is always 'aided in accomplishing the tort
by the existence of the agency' because his responsibilities provide proximity to, and regular contact
with, the victim." (quoting Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 996 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Mackinnon, J.,
concurring))).
143. Id. at 1397-98. The harassment included threats of termination if sexual demands were not
satisfied, battery and rape. Id.
144. Id. at 1398. The court stated:
[W]e conclude that an employer may not be held liable for a supervisor's hostile work
environment harassment if the employer is able to establish that it had adopted policies
and implemented measures such that the victimized employee either knew or should have
known that the employer did not tolerate such conduct and that she could report it to the
employer without fear of adverse consequences.
Id.
145. Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1417 (10th Cir. 1987) ("We find guidance in
the Restatement (Second) of Agency § 219 (1958). Under section 219(1), an employer is liable for
any tort committed by an employee 'while acting in the scope of... employment."'). However, the
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principles were further defined in Hirschfeld v. New Mexico Corre:tions
Department," which held that an employer could be liable for the actions
of a supervisor or employee only if: (1) the employer failed to "remedy
or prevent a hostile or offensive work environment of which manage-
ment-level employees knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care, should
have known" (negligence or recklessness standard); 7 (2) the unlawful
actions of the harassing employee were within the scope of his employ-
ment; or (3) the harassing employee "'purported to act or to speak on
behalf of the principal and there was reliance upon apparent authority, or
he [or she] was aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the
agency relation.""' 9 Of these separate and exclusive avenues of employer
liability for hostile environment sexual harassment, the Tenth Circuit has
been most reluctant to hold an employer liable only under the scope of
employment theory because sexual harassment is never a part of an em-
ployee's job description."
While these same principles apply to both supervisors and co-
employees, the nature of these respective positions trigger different li-
ability principles. Employer liability is more likely to attach when super-
visors, rather than employees, sexually harass employees under the hos-
tile environment theory.'' The Tenth Circuit has generally applied the
"knew or should have known" negligence standard as the basis for em-
ployer liability for employees' hostile environment sexual harassment of
co-employees.' 2 In the case of supervisor harassment, however, the court
court found that section 219(1) was not a reliable tool for finding an employer liable for sexual
harassment by its employees since ."sexual harassment simply is not within the job description of
any supervisor or any other worker in any reputable business."' Id. at 1417-18 (quoting David
Holtzman & Eric Trelz, Recent Development in the Law of Sexual Harassment: Abusive Environ-
ment Claims after Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 31 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 239, 276 (1987)). Instead,
the court felt that section 219(2) was a more helpful standard. Id. at 1418. Section 219(2) "creates
employer liability when (1) the master was negligent or reckless ... and (2) where the servant pur-
ported to act or to speak on behalf of the principal and there was reliance on apparent authority, or he
was aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency relation." Id. (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(d) (1958)).
146. 916 F.2d 572 (10th Cir. 1990).
147. Hirschfeld, 916 F.2d at 577 (quoting EEOC v. Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d 1504, 1516 (9th
Cir. 1989)).
148. Id. at 576-77.
149. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(d)(2)) (alteration in original).
150. Hicks, 833 F.2d at 1417-18 ("'[Clonfining liability ... to situations in which a supervisor
acted within the scope of his authority conceivably could lead to the ludicrous result that employers
would become accountable only if they explicitly require or consciously allow their supervisors to
molest women employees."' (quoting Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141, 151 (D.C. Cir. 1985))).
151. See Hirschfeld, 916 F.2d at 577 (upholding the district court's finding that because the
harasser was not the plaintiff s supervisor there was no apparent authority and the employer could
only be held liable if the negligence standard was met).
152. Hirase-Doi v. U.S. West Communications, Inc., 61 F.3d 777, 783 (10th Cir. 1995) (stating
that since the parties have not disputed the harassing employees' lack of apparent authority, the court
will examine employer liability under the negligence standard); cf Creamer v. Laidlaw Transit, Inc.,
[VLA. 75:3
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has yet to hold an employer liable under the "apparent authority" rule of
liability for a supervisor's hostile environment sexual harassment of su-
pervised employees under Restatement (Second) of Agency section
219(2)(d).'
53
The Tenth Circuit clarified the definition of "employer" in Sauers v.
Salt Lake County.'" Finding no definition of "agent" in the text of Title
VII, the Sauers court held that a supervisor qualifies as an "employer"
under Title VII if the supervisor holds significant control over the plain-
tiff's work environment, including the hiring and firing of the plaintiff.5
Moreover, under this definition, the supervisor functions as the em-
ployer's "alter ego" and can make the employer liable by his or her ille-
gal actions regardless of whether the employer had notice of the supervi-
sor's conduct."w However, in Harrison this language was limited to a
court's determination of whether a sexual harassment claim naming only
the harassing supervisor can also function as a claim against the em-
ployer and does not bear on the employer's liability.''
B. Tenth Circuit Decisions
1. Seymore v. Shawver & Sons, Inc."'
a. Facts
After allegedly being exposed to sexually offensive remarks and
gestures by co-employees, Seymore filed grievances with her job steward
and her union, the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers.'59
Even after she filed these complaints, the plaintiff claims that the har-
86 F.3d 167, 170-71 (10th Cir. 1996) (refusing to hold employer liable but focusing exclusively on
the negligence basis).
153. See Griffith v. Colorado, 17 F.3d 1323, 1330 (10th Cir. 1994) (applying the negligence
"knew or should have known" standard while acknowledging the "apparent authority" avenue);
Sauers v. Salt Lake County, I F.3d 1122, 1125 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding only that the supervisor
held sufficient authority over plaintiff to allow plaintiff's claim against supervisor to also be a claim
a claim against the employer); Hirschfeld, 916 F.2d at 579-80 (affirming the district court's finding
that harassing supervisor did not purport to act on behalf of employer under section 219(2)(d));
Hicks, 833 F.2d at 1417-18 (rejecting negligence as only standard for employer liability for supervi-
sor's hostile environment sexual harassment of supervised employees and remanding for review in
light of agency principles).
154. 1 F.3d 1122 (10th Cir. 1993).
155. Sauers, I F.3d at 1125 ("We agree with the Fourth Circuit that 'an individual qualifies as
an "employer" under Title VII if he or she serves in a supervisory position and exercises significant
control over the plaintiff's hiring, firing or conditions of employment."' (quoting Paroline v. Unysis
Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 104 (4th Cir. 1989))). This language was subsequently limited in Harrison v.
Eddy Potash, Inc., 112 F.3d 1437 (10th Cir. 1997). See infra Part Il.B.2.b.
156. Sauers, I F.3d at 1125 ("In such a situation, the individual operates as the alter ego of the
employer, and the employer is liable for the unlawful employment practices of the individual with-
out regard to whether the employer knew of the individual's conduct.").
157. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.b.
158. 111 F.3d 794 (10th Cir. 1997).For a discussion of the facts, see supra Part I.B. L.a.
159. Seymore, Ill F.3d at 796.
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assing conduct continued.'" The plaintiff then filed a discrimination
charge against Shawver with the Oklahoma Human Rights Commission
(OHRC), who filed a charge on her behalf with the EEOC.6' Subse-
quently, Shawver terminated her employment, which resulted in the
plaintiff filing another charge with the EEOC alleging both racial and
sexual discrimination." She also filed suits against Shawver and the un-
ion alleging only sexual discrimination and retaliatory practices.' At
trial the district court granted summary judgment for the union.'"
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit reiterated the agency principles recited in
Hirschfeld." However, these principles were never applied to the facts
because the court found that the defendant's employees had not satisfied
the requirements for sexual harassment under Title VII.'" In this case, the
plaintiff also wanted to hold the union liable on the basis that unions
should not be able to ignore an employer's unlawful discrimination and
avoid Title VII liability.'67 The court held that because the jury found the
employer not liable for sexual harassment, the union could not likewise
be held liable since the original conduct was not found to be unlawful."
2. Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc.'"
a. Facts
On appeal, the plaintiff contended that the jury instructions failed to
properly instruct the jury regarding employer liability for hostile envi-
ronment sexual harassment under Title VII.'" Specifically, Harrison al-
leged that the trial court: (1) incorrectly combined two separate bases for
employer liability under Title VII; (2) erred in instructing the jury that
the allegedly harassing supervisor, Brown, had to be empowered with a
high degree of control over the plaintiff to impose liability on the defen-






165. Id. at 797.
166. Id. at 798.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. 112 F.3d 1437 (10th Cir. 1997).
170. Harrison, 112 F.3d at 1442. For a discussion of the facts, see supra Part I.B.2.a.
171. Harrison, 112 F.3d at 1442. The jury instruction defining an agency relationship was as
follows:
In order for you to hold the defendant Eddy Potash, Inc. liable to the plaintiff Jeanne
Harrison for the acts of Robert Brown, you must find that Robert Brown was an agent of
defendant Eddy Potash, Inc. In order to determine whether Robert Brown was an agent of
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1998] SEXUAL HARASSMENT
rejected three of her proposed instructions for employer liability for the
sexual harassment of its supervisors under Title VII.'"
b. Decision
In determining whether the district court properly instructed the jury
regarding employer liability, the Tenth Circuit examined the third possi-
ble avenue of liability under the Restatement (Second) of Agency section
219(2)(d)."' The court held that the first and second clauses of section
219(2)(d) should be viewed as two separate bases for liability instead of
one as held in Hirschfeld.' Under the first clause, the court held that a
plaintiff must show that: (1) the employer vested the harassing supervisor
with authority to control "significant aspects" of the harassed employee's
work environment; "6 (2) the supervisor sexually harassed the plaintiff;."
and (3) the plaintiff relied or acted on the apparent authority of his or her
supervisor."'
defendant Eddy Potash, Inc., you must find that Robert Brown exercised significant con-
trol over plaintiff's hiring, firing or conditions of employment at Eddy Potash, Inc., such
that Robert Brown's supervisory position was equivalent to that of managerial control
over plaintiff, thereby creating an employer/employee relationship, thus making Robert
Brown the alter ego of Eddy Potash, Inc.
Id. at 1448.
172. Id. at 1449. The jury instruction on apparent authority was as follows:
If you find that Robert Brown was an agent of Eddy Potash, Inc. then you must also
determine whether Robert Brown was acting with "apparent authority" as an agent of
Eddy Potash, Inc.
In this regard you are instructed that an employer, such as Eddy Potash, Inc., may not
be liable to an employee for the acts of its agent (supervisor) unless its agent had
"authority," whether apparent or otherwise, to commit the acts in question.
In order to determine whether an agent had "apparent authority" you should consider
what knowledge the plaintiff had regarding the authority of the agent to commit such acts
in question. In this regard you should consider whether the employer had established by a
preponderance of the evidence that it had adopted policies against sexual harassment, and
had implemented measures such that a victimized employee knew or should have known
that the employer did not tolerate such conduct and that she could report it to her em-
ployer without fear of adverse consequences.
Id.
173. Id. at 1442.
174. Id. at 1443-46.
175. Hirschfeld v. New Mexico Corrections Dep't, 916 F.2d 572, 579 (10th Cir. 1990).
176. Harrison, 112 F.3d at 1444 ("The first element is established '[wihenever an employer
vests its supervisor with the authority to control significant aspects of the work environment."'
(quoting Glen Allen Staszewski, Using Agency Principles for Guidance in Finding Employer Li-
ability for A Supervisor's Hostile Work Environment Sexual Harassment, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1057,
1089 (1995)) (alteration in original)).
177. Id.
178. Id. The court states that this element would be difficult to prove if the employer has a
formal written grievance policy and has "taken steps 'to remove any possible inference that a super-
visor has authority to sexually harass his subordinates."' Id. (quoting Staszewski, supra note 176, at
1090). In contrast, if an employer fails to have such an established grievance policy, "'a victim of
sexual harassment will reasonably perceive her only available options to be silently acquiescing in
the harassment or leaving her job."' ld. (quoting Staszewski, supra note 176, at 1090). The court
appears to imply that absent a grievance policy, the employer is likely to be liable.
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The second clause of section 219(2)(d) states that the employee
"was aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency rela-
tion."" The court determined that this clause is satisfied when the em-
ployer authorizes a supervisor to control a work environment and the
supervisor abuses that authority by sexually harassing an employee."
Moreover, the court held that employer liability can attach regardless of
whether or not the employer had a written sexual harassment grievance
policy in place which was known to the plaintiff."' The court limited the
extent of this liability, however, by holding that the employer would not
be liable if the agency relation only placed the supervisor in proximity to
the plaintiff. 2
The court summarized its new interpretation of the agency princi-
ples with which to hold employers liable for sexual harassment as fol-
lows:
In summary, an employer in this circuit can be held liable under
Title VII for hostile work environment sexual harassment committed
by one of its supervisors if any of the following conditions are met:
1) The supervisor committed the harassment while acting in
the scope of his employment. See Restatement (Second) of
Agency § 219(1).
2) The employer knew about, or should have known about,
the harassment and failed to respond in a reasonable man-
ner. See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 219(2)(b).
3) If the employer manifested in the supervisor the authority
to act on its behalf, such manifestation resulted in harm to
the plaintiff, and the plaintiff acted or relied on the appar-
ent authority in some way. See Restatement (Second) of
Agency § 219(2)(d), clause 1.
4) If the employer delegated the authority to the supervisor to
control the plaintiff's work environment and the supervisor
abused that delegated authority by using that authority to
aid or facilitate his perpetration of the harassment. See Re-
statement (Second) of Agency § 219(2)(d), clause 2.'"
179. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(d) (1958).
180. Harrison, 112 F.3d at 1445 ("[I]f the supervisor 'is able to misuse that power to create a
hostile work environment, the employer will be liable for having placed him in the position to do
so."' (quoting Staszewski, supra note 176, at 1091)).
181. Id. at 1446.
182. Id. ("We emphasize ... that this interpretation does not allow liability of attach where the




The Harrison court also limited its holding in Sauers regarding the
definition of an "agent" for purposes of Title VII liability.'8" The court
agreed with the plaintiff that she was not required to show that the har-
asser was a supervisor who exercised "significant control" over work-
place conditions including hiring and firing, which the trial court inter-
preted as a prerequisite to establishing employer liability under Sauers.'8
The court explained that the Sauers holding concerned whether a claim
against a supervisor, in his official capacity, could also operate as a claim
against the employer, who was not listed as a party in the plaintiff's ini-
tial cause of action.'" Because Harrison appropriately filed claims against
both her supervisor and the employer, Sauers did not apply.'87
In addressing the question of whether the jury was properly in-
structed, the court held that employer liability for hostile environment
sexual harassment under section 219(2)(d) requires the supervisors to
have apparent or actual authority over the plaintiffs working environ-
ment and that the harassment be aided by that authority.'" Moreover, all
that is required for apparent authority is that the victim or plaintiff rea-
sonably believe that the supervisor has such authority based on "written
or spoken words or any other conduct" of the employer. 9
C. Other Circuits
Many circuits are struggling with the correct agency standard to
apply to employer liability for the sexual harassment by a supervisor. For
example, a plurality of justices on the Seventh Circuit in Jansen v. Pack-
aging Corp. of America believed that negligence was the best standard in
cases of hostile environment sexual harassment, including that of super-
visors.'" However, there was not much clarification on the specific negli-
gence standard.'9 ' In fact, a per curiam opinion in Jansen called on the
184. Id. at 1448 ("[Wie conclude the discussion in Sauers of who constitutes an "agent" for
Title VII purposes is strictly limited to situations in which a court is determining whether a claim
against a named individual defendant (in his official capacity) can operate as a claim against the
employer itself.").
185. Id. at 1447-48 (holding that the requirement of showing the harassing supervisor's signifi-
cant control over the work environment only applies in determinations of whether a suit may pro-
ceed against an employer not listed in the pleadings and "has no applicability in deciding whether
the employer is liable for the conduct of its employees").
186. Id. at 1448.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 1449-50.
189. Id. at 1450 (stating that jury instruction wrongly focused on the knowledge of the plaintiff
regarding apparent authority rather than the plaintiff's reasonable belief).
190. Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 123 F.3d 490, 493-94 (7th Cir. 1997) ("All the judges
with the exception of Judges Easterbrook, Rovner, and Wood believe that negligence is the only
proper standard of employer liability in cases of hostile-environment sexual harassment even if as
here the harasser was a supervisor rather than a coworker of the plaintiff.").
191. Jansen, 123 F.3d at 493-94; see Michael A. Wamer, Jr., Franczek Sullivan Labor and
Employment Report: Supreme Court Agrees to Hear Sexual Harassment Cases While Lower Courts
Struggle, CoRP. LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 1998, at 61 (referring to Jansen, the article states "[a] narrow
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Supreme Court to "bring order to the chaotic case law in the important
field of practice.''
In Faragher v. City of Boca Raton," the Eleventh Circuit, applying
the negligence standard, held that "[a]n employer is directly liable for
hostile environment sexual harassment if it knew, or upon reasonably
diligent inquiry should have known, of the harassment and failed to take
immediate and appropriate action." '  The court further reiterated it's
holding that "in a pure hostile environment case, a supervisor's harassing
conduct is typically outside the scope of his employment," because in
conducting hostile environment sexual harassment only, the supervisor is
not acting within his "actual or apparent authority to hire, fire, discipline
or promote.""'9 The court further emphasized, in deference to Meritor,
that "employers are not automatically liable for the hostile environment
sexual harassment by their supervisors or employees.' However, in
addition to the above direct avenue of employer liability, the Eleventh
Circuit would allow indirect liability to attach if the harassing employee
were acting within the scope of his employment in conducting the har-
assment or if he or she was acting outside the scope of his or her em-
ployment, but is nevertheless aided in accomplishing the unlawful activ-
ity due to the existence of the agency relationship."
majority of the Seventh Circuit agreed that... a 'negligence' standard applies to claims in which a
supervisor's sexual harassment is alleged to have created a 'hostile work environment").
192. Jansen, 123 F.3d at 494-95. The Seventh Circuit, aware of the problems its holding in
Jansen would present the district courts, advised them to "recognize in this welter of opinions that
certain views do command a majority within our court: in particular, that the standard for employer
liability in cases of hostile-environment sexual harassment by a supervisory employee is negligence,
not strict liability." Id.; see Brendan Stephens, 7th Circuit Divided Over Liability for Harassment,
CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Aug. 14, 1997, at I (summarizing the court's divisive ruling in Jansen).
193. 111 F.3d 1530 (11 th Cir.), rev'd, 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998). For a discussion of the Supreme
Court's decision in Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, which was decided after the conclusion of this
survey period, see infra note 232.
194. Faragher, Ill F.3d at 1535. The Eleventh Circuit emphasized that under this theory the
city could be held liable for its own negligence but would not be liable for the harassing conduct of
its supervisors. Id. Like many circuits, the Eleventh Circuit labeled the various agency employer
liability categories as direct and indirect: "[A]n employer is indirectly, or vicariously, liable for the
wrongful conduct of its agent, whether or not the employer knew or should have known about the
agent's wrongful act." Id. Tle employer is likewise indirectly liable for the sexual harassment by its
supervisors if the supervisor was acting within the scope of his or her employment, and if there's an
"agency relationship which aids the supervisor's ability or opportunity to harass his subordinate."Id.
195. Id. at 1535-36.
196. Id. at 1536.
197. Id. The court stated that
this circuit has articulated two agency principles under which an employer may be held
indirectly or vicariously, liable for hostile environment sexual harassment: (1) when a
harasser is acting within the scope of his employment in perpetrating the harassment and
(2) when a harasser is acting outside the scope of his employment, but is aided in accom-
plishing the harassment by the existence of the agency relationship.
Id. (citations omitted). The court explained that the harasser could be within his or her scope of
employment if the harassing act was the agent's method for accomplishing an authorized purpose.
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The plaintiff in Faragher argued that she suffered alleged harass-
ment by her supervisors when she was a lifeguard between 1985 and
1990. '" The alleged harassment consisted of unwanted touching and pat-
ting."' However, the plaintiff did not officially complain to her manage-
ment, the City of Boca Raton's Parks and Recreation Department." The
plaintiff subsequently left her employment to attend law school in 1990
and filed her sexual harassment action against the city in 1992.201 At trial,
the court found for the plaintiff on the sexual harassment claim, awarding
nominal damages of one dollar.' The trial court reasoned that the city
was directly liable for the supervisors' conduct under agency law due to
the supervisors' authority over the plaintiff and the management struc-
ture.' Furthermore, the court held that the city was indirectly liable due
to the fact that the conduct was severe and pervasive, supporting "an
inference of knowledge, or constructive knowledge, on the part of the
city" regarding the supervisors' conduct.'
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the trial court's judgment
for plaintiff on the sexual harassment claims, finding that: (1) the super-
visors were not acting within the scope of their employment because no
evidence supported an inference that the supervisors committed the har-
assment in performing a service for the city;' and (2) the supervisors
were not aided in accomplishing the sexual harassment due to the exis-
tence of the agency relationship because, under common law, the defini-
tion of "aided" refers to use of "an instrumentality of the agency or
through conduct associated with the agency status" to accomplish the
harassment.' Because no such evidence was present in that case the em-
ployer could not be held liable for the unlawful conduct of its supervi-
sors.W
The Second Circuit in Torres v. Pisano' provided an alternative
approach of applying agency principles to employer liability in holding
Id. In this situation, the employer would be unable to avoid liability even if the harasser had been
specifically instructed not to engage in the unlawful behavior. Id.
198. Id. at 1533.
199. Id.
200. Id. The plaintiff did discuss the subject with a friend who was a supervisor but the conver-
sation was not in the context of a subordinate to superior discussion and the supervisor never re-
ported the incidents to management. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 1534.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 1537 ("[T]here is no evidence that Terry and Silverman harassed [the plaintiff] in
order to perform any service for the City, or that they were either explicitly or implicitly authorized
by the city to engage in such harassment."). Furthermore, the court stated that "[this case provides
the archetypical example of employees stepping outside of the scope of their employment and seek-
ing to further personal ends." Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. 116 F.3d 625 (2d Cir. 1997).
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that an employer is liable for the sexual harassment by one of its supervi-
sors if:
(a) the supervisor was at a sufficiently high level in the company, or
(b) the supervisor used his actual or apparent authority to further the
harassment, or was otherwise aided in accomplishing the harassment
by the existence of the agency relationship, or (c) the employer pro-
vided no reasonable avenue for complaint, or (d) the employer knew
(or should have known) of the harassment but unreasonably failed to
stop it.'
Furthermore, in order for the plaintiff to prove liability on the grounds
that the supervisors abused the agency relationship to commit the har-
assment, he or she "must allege facts which establish a nexus between
the supervisory authority and the harassment."2" This would mean that if
the supervisor was aided in accomplishing the tort simply because his
position put him in regular proximity and contact with the victim, no
liability would attach."' Neither would an employer be liable under the
abuse of the employment relationship standard if the plaintiff failed to
complain or resist the harassment because he or she feared
repercussions." '
In Torres, the Second Circuit limited a portion of its broad holding
in Karibian in a footnote which drew, ironically, from the Tenth Cir-
cuit's treatment of the second clause of section 219(2)(d) of the Restate-
ment of Agency in Harrison."' Karibian had held the existence of a
complaint procedure and lack of notice to the employer would not auto-
matically protect the employer from liability." In contrast, Torres fo-
cused on Harrison's statement that the apparent authority standard will
be difficult to prove "and will often hinge upon whether the employer
has a formal policy against sexual harassment." Moreover, "if an em-
ployer has taken steps to remove any possible inference that a supervisor
has authority to sexually harass his subordinates, the victim is likely
aware the harassment is not authorized and reliance on apparent authority
209. Torres, 116 F.3d at 634; see Jeffrey S. Klein & Nicholas J. Pappas, Employment Law:
Liability for Sexual Harassment by Supervisors, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 6, 1997, at 3 (explaining the Torres
decision).
210. Torres, 116 F.3d at 635 (quoting Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1306 (2d Cir.
1995)).
211. Klein & Pappas, supra note 209.
212. Id.
213. Torres, 116 F.3d at 635 n. 14 ("(T]he first clause of section 219(2)(d) of the Restatement..
provides for liability if 'the servant purported to act or to speak on behalf of the principal and there
was reliance upon apparent authority."' (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(d)
(1958))).
214. Karibian v. Columbia Univ., 14 F.3d 773, 779-80 (2d Cir. 1994); see also Gregory, supra
note 136, at 386 ("Most significantly, the court [in Karibian] held that lack of notice to the employer
and the existence of complaint procedures do not automatically insulate an employer from liabil-
ity.").
215. Torres, 116 F.3d at 636 n. 14 (quoting Harrison, 112 F.3d at 1444).
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will be difficult to establish." 6 Under this new language, the Torres
court found that because it was not disputed that the plaintiff knew of the
defendant's sexual harassment policy, the employer could not be liable.2 '
The effect of Torres was to limit Karibian to its facts in regards to the
apparent authority issue. This means that the presence of a sexual har-
assment policy combined with efforts to make the employees fully aware
of that policy will, in the Second Circuit, generally shield employers
from liability for the sexual harassment by its supervisors as long as the
employer is not actually or constructively aware of the harassment."'
D. Analysis
Under the Tenth Circuit's new interpretation of the agency princi-
ples regarding employer liability, the court appears to have made em-
ployers strictly liable for their supervisors hostile environment sexual
harassment of their supervised employees, contrary to the Supreme
Court's holding in Meritor. The decision also allows employees to bring
hostile environment sexual harassment claims against co-employees un-
der the court's interpretation of the third basis of liability, instead of the
standard "knew or should have known" direct negligence approach.
Unlike past hostile environment sexual harassment cases involving
co-employees, the negligence standard need not be applied in cases al-
leging supervisor's hostile environment sexual harassment. The third
basis of liability, as interpreted by the court, bypasses all other avenues
of liability and hinges only on the plaintiff's reasonable, subjective belief
that the employer authorized the supervisor's behavior."9 An employer's
216. Id. (quoting Harrison, 112 F.3d at 1444).
217. Id. at 635 (explaining that liability under the indirect apparent authority argument "cannot
attach ... in the instant case ... as it is undisputed that Torres knew of NYU's harassment policy
and its availability").
218. See Klein & Pappas, supra note 209 ("Torres' contrary application of § 219(2)(d) limits
Karibian to its facts and supercedes this aspect of Karibian."). A particular irony for the Tenth
Circuit occurred with the Torres holding. Essentially, the Second Circuit in Torres borrowed specific
language on apparent authority from the holding in Harrison to limit its broad language in Karibian,
which was in conflict with a majority of the federal circuit courts. Id. ("Karibian ... place[d] the
Second Circuit in conflict with a majority of the other federal circuits by suggesting that a claim for
hostile work environment sexual harassment could be established even in circumstances where the
employer had a written policy against sexual harassment and took prompt action to end it following
proper notice of the victim's claim."). Harrison, however, borrowed that same language from
Karibian, limited by Torres, to announce a much broader reading, not of the first clause of section
219(2)(d), as Karibian did, but for the second clause. Harrison, 112 F.3d at 1446 ("In our view, the
better interpretation is that adopted by the Second Circuit in Karibian (which] ... allows an em-
ployer to be held liable, even if a sexual harassment policy is in place and is made known to plain-
tiff, where the supervisor uses his actual or apparent authority to aid or facilitate his perpetration of
the harassment.").
219. Harrison, 112 F.3d at 1450. The court stated that apparent authority only requires that the
victim, or third party, perceive that the supervisor is empowered by "written or spoken words or any
other conduct of the principal which, reasonably interpreted, causes the (victim] to believe that the
principal consents to have the act done on his behalf by the person purporting to act for him." Id.
(quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 27 (1958)). This "consent" reasonably perceived
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strongest defense argument appears to be that the plaintiff's belief in the
apparent authority of the supervisor is unreasonable due to the existence
of a written sexual harassment grievance policy, combined with efforts to
notify prospective plaintiffs that the supervisor has no authority to sexu-
ally harass them.'
However, even this defense is circumvented by the new interpreta-
tion of the second clause of section 219(2)(d), which finds the employer
liable only if the supervisor is empowered to control the work environ-
ment and then abuses that authority in harassing employees.22' Such em-
ployer consent to the supervisor's control is virtually inherent in all su-
pervisory authority.2 Any hostile environment sexual harassment by the
supervisor that occurs while on the job is an abuse of the supervisor's
authority over his or her employees. As long as these basic employment
circumstances are proven, the employer is strictly liable.
Yet, even in Karibian, with its similar holding to Harrison, the Sec-
ond Circuit held an employer automatically liable only if its supervisor
relied on his authority in committing hostile environment sexual harass-
ment.' Under Karibian, if no such reliance is found, liability is not
automatically imputed to the employer and the negligence standard is
applied. ' The Harrison court suggested no such distinction." Therefore,
by the victim can merely include the fact that the supervisor is continuously employed by the princi-
pal. See Oppenheimer, supra note 9, at 81 ("The principal may manifest his consent to a community
of persons in a variety of ways, including continuously employing the agent.").
220. Harrison, 112 F.3d at 1450 (stating that the first clause of section 219(2)(d) will be diffi-
cult to prove if there is an existing grievance policy plus efforts "to remove any possible inference
that a supervisor has authority to sexually harass his subordinates" (quoting Staszewski, supra note
176, at 1087)).
221. Id.
222. See Oppenheimer, supra note 9, at 80 ("Employers ... often act only through the actions
of their supervisors. Supervisors act as the eyes, ears, and, most importantly, voice of the employer
in all interactions with employees. Supervisors . .. oversee operations.. . and generally influence-
and at times determine-the working environment of non-supervisory employees.").
223. Karibian v. Columbia Univ., 14 F.3d 773,780 (2d Cir. 1994).
224. Id.
225. Harrison, 112 F.3d at 1450 ("[T]he fact that the supervisor has actual or apparent authority
to control the victim's working environment, and is aided in harassing the victim by that authority, is
sufficient to establish employer liability under the second clause of § 219(2)(d)."). The Harrison
court's requirement that the supervisor's authority "aid" the supervisor's conduct is a lower standard
than the Karibian court's requirement of a supervisor's "reliance" on his own supervisory authority
to enable his harassment. Reliance on existing authority implies active invocation or assertion of that
authority to act unlawfully, whereas existing authority as aiding or facilitating unlawful activity
implies a passive, opportunistic activity. For example, a supervisor who calls a victim to his office
for the purpose of harassing him or her relies on the employee's obeying his delegated authority and
dutifully reporting to the office at the time the supervisor chooses; however, a supervisor who re-
ceives random, unscheduled visits from his employees in his office for purposes of daily updates
may choose to take advantage of such a chance visit to commit unlawful harassment once the op-
portunity has presented itself. In the first instance, the supervisor has actively initiated the harassing
encounter by exercising the authority on which he relies to compel the employee into his office. In
the second instance, the supervisor merely takes advantage of a chance situation, whereby the em-
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if a supervisor is found by a jury to have committed hostile environment
sexual harassment of employees under his or her control under Title VII,
the employer is strictly liable.'
The Tenth Circuit attempted to avoid criticism of applying strict
liability in an area forbidden by the Supreme Court by stating that the
employer will not be held liable if the authority delegated to the supervi-
sor only provides the supervisor with proximity to the plaintiff. However,
such a scenario could not occur unless the supervisor had no supervisory
authority over the plaintiff. In this situation, the supervisor's legal status
for purposes of employer liability is converted to that of a co-employee.
For example, if the supervisor did have authority over the plaintiff
then the supervisor would not only have the right to be in proximity to
the plaintiff but would also have supervisory control over the plaintiff. If,
however, a harassing supervisor's delegated authority only gives him the
right to be in proximity to the plaintiff and the plaintiff does not reasona-
bly believe that the supervisor has authority over him or her, then the
supervisor is merely a co-employee in relation to the plaintiff. Therefore,
the issue is no longer whether a supervisor harassed his employee, but
whether a co-employee harassed another co-employee. In this situation
the "knew or should have known" negligence standard would apply. 27
Another effect of the court's decision regarding the third basis of
liability is that an employee may reasonably perceive a co-employee to
hold supervisory authority over him or her and argue hostile environment
sexual harassment under the third or fourth bases of liability instead of
under the negligence standard similar to past cases. Because the court
rejects the Sauers requirement of proving the employer vested the em-
ployee with supervisory power over the plaintiff prior to establishing
employer liability, no such determination ever has to be made under the
ployee has entered his office under no compulsion but to inform the supervisor of job-related devel-
opments in deference to the supervisor's authority. This small distinction will lead to different re-
sults depending upon whether the case arises in the Second or Tenth Circuits: under Karibian, only
the first scenario will impute liability to the employer whereas under Harrison both scenarios will
result in employer liability. Id. at 1445, 1448.
226. See Gregory, supra note 136, at 391-92. In discussing the second clause of section
219(2)(d) as interpreted by the Second Circuit in Karibian, which contains the same language
adopted by the Tenth Circuit in Harrison, Gregory argues:
[Uinder the [Karibian] court's broad holding, a high-level supervisor charged with cre-
ating a hostile work environment invariably will be viewed by the employee as able to
harass primarily because of his position in the company. The employee naturally will be
fearful that the supervisor will use the authority delegated by the employer to retaliate.
Thus a plaintiff will always be able to show that-at least from her perspective-the su-
pervisor was "aided in accomplishing" the harassment because ... he was a supervisor.
Whether that supervisor in fact used his supervisory authority to create the abusive envi-
ronment becomes irrelevant. An employer is thus held strictly liable for misconduct by
supervisors, even though the supervisor did not utilize the power granted by the employer
to further his illicit actions.
Id.
227. For a discussion of the different standards of employer liability between harassment by
supervisors and harassment by co-employees, see supra Part II.A.
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third basis for liability.2" All that is required is that the plaintiff reasona-
bly believed that the harassing employee held sufficient authority from
the employer to control "significant aspects" of the work environment,.'
based on written or verbal communications, "or any other conduct" of
the employer." °
For example, co-employees may appear to have authority to control
"significant aspects" of the victim's work environment if the harassing
employee holds seniority over the victim; they may have been authorized
or told to train the victim by the company's management; or the em-
ployee may simply believe that management's favorable treatment of
senior employees coupled with their assertion of authority over the vic-
tim demonstrates their control over the victim's work environment. If the
company does not have a written sexual harassment grievance policy in
place and has not taken steps to assure the employee that the harasser has
no authority to sexually harass him or her, the harassed employee may
feel he or she has no other options but to endure the abusive environment
or quit his or her job.'
Policies behind hostile environment sexual harassment law are not
well served under the court's ruling in Harrison. Employers may estab-
lish sexual harassment grievance policies and employee training pro-
grams at great expense, but even the most efficient of such programs will
have no effect upon the employer's liability where a plaintiff brings a
hostile environment sexual harassment action against an employer under
the fourth basis of liability. Recall that Harrison only requires that the
employer give an employee control over a particular work environment,
and, if in the course of supervising that environment, the supervisor is
found to have committed hostile environment sexual harassment then the
employer is automatically liable. As a result of this decision, employers
can only extensively train their supervisors regarding sexual harassment
and then hope that they never commit an indiscretion or act in any way
that may be interpreted as creating a hostile environment under Title VII.
Once an incident of sexual harassment by a supervisor occurs, the
employer's defenses-() that it was unaware of the activity, (2) that it
took appropriate remedial action to end the harassment, or (3) that the
employee was aware of sexual harassment grievance policies and failed
to use them-are all irrelevant. The employer is left with the alternatives
of settlement or expending all of its energies in court trying to prove the
sexually hostile environment did not exist. In other words, regardless of
228. For a discussion of the Harrison court's limitation of the Sauers opinion, see supra Part
II.B.2.b.
229. Harrison, 112 F.3d at 1444.
230. Id. at 1450.
231. Id. at 1444 ("'When an employer lacks a formal written grievance policy, a victim of
sexual harassment will reasonably perceive her only available options to be silently acquiescing in
the harassment or leaving her job."' (quoting Staszewski, supra note 176, at 1090)).
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what positive, proactive, effective steps the employer has taken to eradi-
cate sexual harassment and provide victims with internal recourse, its
prior efforts are in vain once such harassment occurs.
CONCLUSION
Seymore and Harrison represent a significant shift in the Tenth Cir-
cuit's attitude toward the elements of hostile environment sexual harass-
ment and the employer's liability for such acts by both employees and
supervisors. In Seymore, the court established clear-cut elements for a
prima facie case of hostile environment sexual harassment but failed to
address the nature of the conduct contributing to a hostile environment.
More significantly, Harrison's holding poses a new and substantial
risk to employers. Harrison's holding gives plaintiffs an entirely new
basis to establish liability and allows the plaintiff's subjective percep-
tions of the authority of the harasser to impute liability to the employer.
Thus, in the Tenth Circuit the deep pockets of the employer have become
substantially more accessible to plaintiffs with viable hostile environ-
ment claims against their supervisors."2 Moreover, under Harrison, li-
ability insurance providers may choose to raise their premiums as well as
their requirements for coverage due to employers' increased liability
under Harrison.
The cost of this decision in terms of financial expenditure and ir-
relevant good intentions falls on the backs of the employers. This was the
232. The Tenth Circuit's holding in Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., regarding employer liability
for sexual harassment by supervisors, proved to be short-lived. Following this survey period and the
completion of this article, the Supreme Court issued two decisions on June 26, 1998, Burlington
Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998) and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct.
2275 (1998), which announced a new standard of employer liability for sexual harassment by super-
visors.
In these cases, the Court held that employers are vicariously liable for the sexual harassment
committed by their supervisors and will be automatically liable "when the supervisor's harassment
culminates in a tangible employment action, such as discharge, demotion, or undesirable reassign-
ment." Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2292-93.
However, where the supervisor's harassment does not result in a tangible employment action,
yet still creates an allegedly hostile environment, the employer may raise an affirmative defense as to
liability or damages. Id. at 2293. The affirmative defense must be proven by a preponderance of the
evidence and requires the satisfaction of two elements: "(a) that the employer exercised reasonable
care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff em-
ployee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventative or corrective opportunities pro-
vided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise." Id.
On the same day that the Court decided Bulington Industries and Faragher, it vacated and
remanded Harrision v. Eddy Potash, Inc. for reconsideration in light of the new liability standard.
Eddy Poatash, Inc. v. Harrison, 118 S. Ct. 2364 (1998) (mem.). At publication, the Tenth Circuit has
yet to render a decision in the case.
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very same fate the Supreme Court in Meritor directed the federal circuit
courts to avoid."3
Robert P. Henley
233. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986). The Court held that because Con-
gress's definition of "employer" in Title VII included the employer's agents, Congress intended to
limit employer liability for certain sexually harassing acts by supervisors. Id. Therefore, the Court
held that employers are not always "automatically" liable under such circumstances but neither can
employers always insulate themselves from liability by arguing they had no notice of the harass-
ment. Id.
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